

# POLITICS

## BOOK I

### [THE HUMAN GOOD AND THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY]

#### [THE CITY IS THE HUMAN COMMUNITY AIMING AT THE ULTIMATE GOOD]

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1252a

We see that every city is some sort of community,\* and that every community is constituted for the sake of some good, since everyone does everything for the sake of what seems good.<sup>1</sup> Clearly, then, while all communities aim at some good, the community that aims most of all at the good—at the good that most of all controls all the other goods—

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is the one that most of all controls and includes the others; and this is the one called the city, the political community.<sup>2</sup>

#### [THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLITICAL RULE AND OTHER FORMS OF RULE]

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It is wrong, then, to suppose, as some do,<sup>3</sup> that the character of the politician,\* the king, the household manager, and the slave-master is the same. People suppose this because they think the difference is not a difference in kind, but only in the number who are ruled, so that the ruler of a few is a master, the ruler of more people is a household-manager, and the ruler of still more people is a politician or a king—on the assumption that a large household is no different from a small city. And all they can say to distinguish a king from a politician is that someone

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who directs things himself is a king, whereas someone who follows the principles<sup>4</sup> of political science, ruling and being ruled in turn, is a politician. These views are not true.

What we mean will be clear if the investigation follows our recognized

1. **everyone . . . what seems good:** Cf. *EN* 1094a1–3, 1102a2–3.

2. **the city, the political community:** Aristotle relies, as he often does (cf. 1253a2–3) on the connection between *polis* and the adjective *politikos*.

3. **as some do:** See Plato, *Statesman* 259b. On the importance of distinguishing different types of rule see 1278b32, 1324b32.

4. **principles:** *logoi*. See *REASON*.

line\* of inquiry.<sup>5</sup> Just as in other cases we must divide the composite into incomposites, since these are the smallest parts of the whole, so also in this case we must investigate the components of the city; for then we will also see better the difference between these rulers, and the prospect of finding any sort of scientific treatment<sup>6</sup> of the questions we have mentioned.

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#### [THE ELEMENTARY COMMUNITIES LEADING TO A CITY]

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The best way to study this as well as other matters is to trace things back to their beginnings<sup>7</sup> and observe their growth. First, then, those who cannot exist without each other have to form pairs, as female and male do for reproduction. And they do this not because of any decision,\* but from the natural impulse that they share with other animals and with plants to leave behind another of the same kind as oneself.<sup>8</sup>

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Self-preservation <rather than reproduction> is the basis of the natural division between ruler and subject. For the capacity for rational foresight makes one a natural ruler and natural master, and the capacity to execute this foresight by bodily labor<sup>9</sup> makes another a subject and a natural slave; that is why the interests of master and slave coincide.

Now there is a natural distinction between the female and the slave. For nature makes nothing stingily, like a smith making a Delphic knife,<sup>10</sup> but makes one thing for one function, since the best instrument for a particular function is made exclusively for it, not for many others. Among foreigners,\* however, female and slave have the same rank; the reason is that no foreigners are natural rulers, and so their community consists of a female slave and a male slave. Hence the poets say 'It is to be expected that Greeks rule over foreigners', assuming that the foreigner and the slave are naturally the same.

1252b

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And so from these two communities <between female and male and between slave and master> the first community that results is the household. Hesiod<sup>11</sup> was right when he said 'Get first of all a house, a wife,

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5. **line of inquiry:** For this method cf. *HA* 486a5–14, *PA* 646a13.

6. **scientific treatment:** Lit. 'belonging to a craft', *technikon*.

7. **beginnings:** *archai*. See *PRINCIPLE* #1.

8. **natural impulse . . . oneself:** Cf. *DA* 415a26.

9. **to execute . . . labor:** Read *tauta tōi sōmati poiein*. (OCT: 'to labor with one's body'.)

10. **a Delphic knife:** Like a Swiss army knife, with several different functions.

11. **Hesiod:** *Works and Days* 406.

and a plough-ox'—for the poor use an ox in place of a slave. Hence the community naturally formed for every day<sup>12</sup> is a household of 'breadbin-mates' (as Charondas\* calls them) or (as Epimenides\* the Cretan says) 'manger-mates'.

The first community formed from a number of households for long-term advantage is a village, and the most natural type of village would seem to be an extension of a household, including children and grandchildren, sometimes called 'milkmates'. That is why cities were also originally ruled by kings and some nations are ruled by kings even at present; they were formed from communities ruled by kings—for in every household the oldest member rules as its king, and the same is true in its extensions,<sup>13</sup> because the villagers are related by kinship. Homer<sup>14</sup> describes this when he says 'Each rules over his children and wives', because they were isolated, as households were in ancient times.

And for the same reason everyone says the gods are ruled by a king; it is because we were all ruled by kings in ancient times, and some still are, and human beings ascribe to the gods a human way of life, as well as a human form.

The complete\* community, formed from a number of villages, is a city. Unlike the others, it has the full degree of practically every sort of self-sufficiency;\* it comes to be for the sake of living, but remains in being<sup>15</sup> for the sake of living well. That is why every city is natural, since the previous communities are natural. For the city is their end, and nature is an end; for we say that something's nature (for instance, of a human being, a horse, or a household) is the character it has when its coming to be is complete.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the final cause and end is the best <good>, and self-sufficiency is both the end and the best <good>.

1253a

[THE CITY FULFILLS HUMAN NATURE]

It is evident, then, that the city exists by nature, and that a human being is by nature a political animal.<sup>17</sup> Anyone without a city because of his nature rather than his fortune is either worthless or superior to a human

12. **for every day:** i.e., for more than a short period. Or perhaps 'for day to day needs'.

13. **extensions:** i.e., villages.

14. **Homer:** *Odyssey* ix 114, referring to the Cyclopes.

15. **remains in being:** Lit. just 'is'. For the contrast with COMING TO BE see BEING #3. For the contrast between living and living well (i.e., HAPPINESS) cf. 1280a31.

16. **for we say . . . is complete:** Cf. *Phys.* 193b12n.

17. **political animal:** See MAN #4.

being. Like the man reviled by Homer,<sup>18</sup> 'he has no kin, no law, no home'. For his natural isolation from a city gives him an appetite for war, since, like <a solitary piece> in a game of checkers, he has no partner.

It is evident why a human being is more of a political animal than is any bee or any gregarious animal; for nature, we say, does nothing pointlessly,<sup>19</sup> and a human being is the only animal with rational discourse.<sup>20</sup> A voice signifies pleasure and pain, and so the other animals, as well as human beings, have it, since their nature is far enough advanced for them to perceive pleasure and pain and to signify them to one another. But rational discourse is for making clear what is expedient or harmful, and hence what is just or unjust. For this is distinctive of human beings in contrast to the other animals, that they are the only ones with a perception of good and evil, and of just and unjust, and so on; and it is community in these that produces a household and a city.

Further, the city is naturally prior\* to the household and to the individual, since the whole is necessarily prior to the part.\* For if the whole animal is dead, neither foot nor hand will survive, except homonymously,\* as if we were speaking of a stone hand—for that is what a dead hand will be like. Now everything is defined by its function<sup>21</sup> and potentiality; and so anything that has lost them should not be called the same thing, but a homonymous thing.

Clearly, then, the city is also natural and is prior to the individual. For if the individual separated from the city is not self-sufficient, his relation to it corresponds to that of parts to wholes in other cases;<sup>22</sup> and anyone who is incapable of membership in a community, or who has no need of it because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.

Everyone has a natural impulse, then, toward this sort of community, and whoever first constituted it is the cause of the greatest goods. For just as a human being is the best of the animals if he has been completed, he is also the worst of them if he is separated from law and the rule of justice. For injustice is most formidable when it is armed, and a human being naturally grows up armed and equipped for intelligence and virtue,

18. Homer, *Iliad* ix 63.

19. **nature . . . pointlessly:** See NATURE #6.

20. **rational discourse;** *logos*. See REASON #2, *Met.* 1006a13–15, *Rhet.* 1355b1. Having *logos* is contrasted with simply having a voice.

21. **everything . . . function:** For the appeal to FUNCTION cf. EN 1097b24.

22. **For if . . . cases:** Aristotle argues that since the city is naturally PRIOR to the individual (since without it individuals cannot fulfill their nature), it is also natural (as claimed in 1253a2).

but can most readily use this equipment for ends that are contrary to intelligence and virtue;<sup>23</sup> hence without virtue he is the most unscrupulous and savage of animals, the most excessive in pursuit of sex and food. Justice, however, is political; for the rule of justice is an order in the political community, and justice is the judgment of what is just.<sup>24</sup>

## [THE HOUSEHOLD]

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- 1253b Since it is evident what parts constitute the city, we must first discuss household\* science, since every city is constituted of households. The parts of household management are the constituent parts of the household, and a complete household is constituted of slaves and free people.
- 5 Since we should begin our inquiry with the smallest parts of a thing, and since the primary and smallest parts of a household are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children, we should investigate these three things to see what each of them is and what its character ought to be. The three are: the combination ruled by the master; the marital combination (since the combination of woman and man has no established name<sup>25</sup>); and, third, the child-producing combination (since this has no distinctive name either). Let these, then, be <the names of> the three we mentioned. There is also a fourth part, which some people think is <the whole of> household management, and which others think is the greatest part of it; and we should study what is true of this—I refer to what is called money-making.

## [SLAVERY]

- 15 First, let us discuss master and slave, to see what is useful for the necessities of life, and to see if we can reach knowledge, that improves on current views about them.<sup>26</sup> For some suppose that rule over slaves is a science, and that household management, rule over slaves, political science, and kingly science, are all the same, as we said at the beginning.<sup>27</sup>
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23. **contrary . . . virtue:** Cf. EN 1103a23–26, 1144b1–14.

24. **Justice, however . . . just:** This sentence explains why justice, and therefore the city, is the cause (as claimed above) of great benefits; it guards against the bad effects of injustice.

25. **no established name:** Lit. 'no NAME'.

26. **to see what is useful . . . current views about them:** For these two purposes of the *Politics* cf. 1279b12.

27. **beginning:** Aristotle returns to correct the error mentioned at 1252a7 above.

Others, however, suppose that ruling over slaves is against nature, since (they say) law\* makes one free and another a slave, whereas nature draws no distinction between them; that is why such rule (they say) is also unjust, since it rests on force.<sup>28</sup>

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Possession is a part of the household, and acquisition of possessions is a part of household management, since we can neither live nor live well without the necessities; and so, just as the well-defined crafts need their proper tools if they are to complete their work, the same is true of the household manager. Some tools are inanimate, others animate; the pilot, for instance, uses the rudder as an inanimate tool, and the lookout as an animate tool (since in the practice of the crafts a servant serves as a tool). In the same way, then, a possession is a tool for living, and one's possessions are a collection of tools; a slave, then, is a particular sort of animate tool, and every servant is a tool prior to <other> tools.<sup>29</sup>

For suppose that each tool could follow orders, or could itself perceive in advance what is needed, and so could complete its work by itself, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, according to the poet, 'moved by themselves into the assembly of gods';<sup>30</sup> if, in the same way, a shuttle worked by itself and a plectrum struck the chords of a lyre by itself, master-craftsmen would have no need of servants, and masters would have no need of slaves.

What we <normally> call tools are in fact tools for production, while a possession is a tool for action;<sup>31</sup> for a shuttle results in something apart from its use, whereas a garment or a bed results only in the use of it. Further, since action and production differ in species, and tools are needed for both, tools must also differ correspondingly. Now a way of life is action, not production; that is why a slave is a servant in what promotes action.<sup>32</sup>

We speak of a possession in the same way as we speak of a part; for a part is not only a part of another thing, but belongs altogether to the other thing; and the same is true of a possession. That is why a master

28. **rests on force:** Since it is contrary to NATURE, it rests on FORCE.

29. **prior . . . tools:** As the next paragraph explains, a slave is needed in order to use the other tools.

30. **'moved . . . gods':** Homer, *Iliad* ix 376.

31. **action: praxis.** Here Aristotle contrasts *praxis* with the production of artifacts in particular. Elsewhere he contrasts it with all production by CRAFTS (not just those that produce physical artifacts). See ACTION, *Rhet.* 1360b16.

32. **that is why . . . action:** since he is a tool for living.

is only a master of a slave, and does not also belong to the slave, whereas the slave not only is the slave of a master, but also belongs altogether to the master.

- 15 It is clear from this, then, what the nature and capacity of a slave is. Someone is a natural slave if, though a human being, he belongs to another, not to himself; a human being belongs to another if, though a human being, he is a possession; and a possession is a tool that is for action and is separable.<sup>33</sup>

[ARE THERE ANY NATURAL SLAVES?]

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- 20 We must next consider whether there are any natural slaves<sup>34</sup>—any for whom it is better and just to be slaves—or there are none, so that all slavery is against nature; this is easy both to study from arguments and to grasp from the things that happen.<sup>35</sup>

- 25 For ruling and being ruled are not only necessary, but also expedient; and right from birth some <members of a species> are suited for<sup>36</sup> ruling, and are divided from those suited for being ruled. There are many species of rulers and ruled, and in every case rule over the better is better—for instance, rule over a human being is better than rule over a beast; for the function fulfilled by better agents is a better function, and where one rules and another is ruled, both have a function.

- 30 For whenever things are constituted from a number <of parts>—continuous or divided—and one common whole results, the ruler and the ruled are discernible in every case. Animate things receive this order from the nature of the universe; for even things without life—for instance, a musical harmony—have some sort of ruling principle.<sup>37</sup> But presumably this is a topic for a more popular\* investigation than the present one.

- 35 An animal, first of all, is constituted primarily of soul and body; and the soul is the natural ruler, whereas the body is ruled. In investigating

33. **tool that is . . . separable:** Aristotle relies on the use of *organon* (see INSTRUMENT) both for a tool and for a bodily organ. A bodily organ is part of its possessor, and so inseparable, whereas a slave is not actually part of his owner.

34. **whether . . . natural slaves:** Cf. Alcidamas, quoted at *Rhet.* 1373b18.

35. **things that happen:** This is the sort of evidence that Aristotle sometimes calls 'APPEARANCES'. For the contrast between appearances and arguments see REASON #3.

36. **suited for:** Lit. 'toward', *epi*.

37. **ruling principle:** *archē*. See PRINCIPLE. Aristotle relies on the use of *archē* both for political rule and for a first principle or CAUSE.

what is natural, we should attend to things in the natural condition, not in a corrupt condition; hence we should also study human beings in the best condition of body and soul. In this case it is clear <that the soul is the natural ruler>; for in depraved people, or those in a depraved condition, the body often seems to rule the soul, because their condition is base and unnatural.

As we say, then, it is in an animal first of all that we can observe a master's rule and political rule. For the rule of soul over body is a master's rule, and the rule of intellect over desire is political, or rather kingly,<sup>38</sup> rule. And here it is evident\* that it is natural and expedient for the body to be ruled by the soul, and for the affective part to be ruled by intellect, by the part that has reason,<sup>39</sup> whereas equality or the reverse order is harmful for all.

The same applies to the rule of human beings over other animals. For the tame animals are naturally better than the wild, and it is better for all the tame ones to be ruled by a human being, since that is how they are preserved. Further, the male is naturally superior, the female inferior, and the male is naturally the ruler and the female the ruled; and this must be true of all human beings as well <as of other animals>.

Hence those who are as different <from normal human beings> as body is from soul, or beast from human being—and this is the condition of those whose function and best product is the use of their body—these are natural slaves, and it is better for them, just as for the others we have mentioned, to be ruled by a master's rule.

For someone is a natural slave if he is capable of belonging to another<sup>40</sup> (that is why he belongs to another<sup>41</sup>)—if, that is to say, he shares in reason enough to perceive it <in another> without having it himself. For the other animals obey feelings, not reason;<sup>42</sup> and moreover, the use of slaves differs little from the use of tame animals, since both provide bodily help in securing necessities.

Now, nature tends<sup>43</sup> to distinguish the bodies as well <as the souls> of the free and the slaves, so that slaves' bodies are strong for use in

38. **or rather kingly:** since intellect (see UNDERSTANDING) and DESIRE are not equals.

39. **part that has reason:** See SOUL #4.

40. **capable of belonging to another:** i.e., he has no rational part of his own.

41. **belongs to another:** in the sense specified in 1254a8–13, in the comparison with parts of a body.

42. **obey feelings, not reason:** To this extent they are like slaves (though they differ in being unable to perceive *logos*—REASON or rational discourse—in another).

43. **tends:** Or 'aims' (*bouletai*).

30 securing necessities, whereas free people's bodies are upright, and so  
 35 useless for such work, but useful for political life (which is divided into  
 1255a use in war and use in peace). In fact, however, the contrary <of the  
 natural tendency> often happens too, so that some have free people's  
 bodies, and others have their souls. For at any rate it is evident that if  
 some people's bodies turned out to be as superior as the images of the  
 gods are, everyone would say that the inferior are appropriately slaves  
 to the superior. And if this is true in the case of the body, it is much  
 more justifiable to draw the distinction in the case of the soul; but the  
 beauty of the soul is less easily seen than the beauty of the body.

It is evident, then, that some are naturally free, others natural slaves;  
 and for natural slaves slavery is both expedient and just.

[REASONS FOR DOUBT ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF NATURAL SLAVES<sup>44</sup>]

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5 On the other hand, it is easy to see that those who take the contrary  
 view <that slavery is unjust> are also in a way correct. For we speak  
 in two ways of slavery and a slave. <Apart from the natural slave>,  
 there is also a legal slave, and legal slavery; for this law is a sort of  
 agreement declaring that the losers in war belong to the winners. Now  
 many students of law impeach this <allegedly> just <provision> as  
 10 unlawful, as if it were a speaker;<sup>45</sup> for they find it shocking that if one  
 side is strong enough to force the other and is superior in power, the  
 victim of the force is to be ruled as a slave. Some take this view, and  
 others, among the wise as well <as among the many>, take the other  
 view.

15 This dispute arises, and the arguments overlap,<sup>46</sup> because virtue,  
 if supplied with resources, also, in a way, has the most power to  
 force, and moreover, in every case the winner excels in *some* good.  
 This makes it seem that superior force always implies virtue, and  
 that only a question of justice is in dispute.<sup>47</sup> This is why some think

44. Having put forward his own view, Aristotle now shows that it avoids the objections that might seem to refute belief in natural slavery.

45. **as if it were a speaker:** Aristotle refers to the Athenian provision allowing a speaker in the Assembly to challenge the legality (in American terms, the 'constitutionality') of any provision proposed by another speaker.

46. **overlap:** The arguments share a common premiss, that superior virtue gives a basis for ruling (see next note).

47. **This dispute . . . in dispute:** Both sides agree that (1) superior virtue gives a basis for ruling. The defenders of slavery by conquest also believe that (2) superior force implies superior virtue. In 'because virtue . . . in *some* good'

justice is goodwill,<sup>48</sup> while others think that precisely this rule by the superior in power is just. For when these arguments are taken in separation,<sup>49</sup> neither has any strong or persuasive reply to the view that it is right for the one who is better in virtue to rule. 20

And in general some cling to what they take to be a sort of justice (since law is a sort of justice) when they take enslavement in war to be just. But at the same time they say it is not just.<sup>50</sup> For the wars may begin unjustly, and one would never say that someone who does not deserve to be enslaved is a slave. If we disagree with this, it will turn out that those who seem most nobly born are slaves or the sons of slaves, if it happens that they <or their fathers> are captured and sold into slavery. That is why the people they mean to call slaves are not these <nobly born> people, but only foreigners; but in saying this, they are looking for the natural slaves<sup>51</sup> we referred to at the beginning, since one must concede that some are slaves everywhere, some nowhere. 25

The same is true of noble birth. People count themselves nobly born not only at home, but everywhere, but the foreigners only at home—assuming that they, unlike the foreigners, are free and nobly born without qualification, as Theodectes'\* Helen says: 'I am from divine stock on both father's and mother's side. Who then would think it fitting to call me a servant girl?' Whenever they say this, they distinguish slave and free, and the nobly born and the baseborn, precisely by appeal to virtue and vice; for they think it fitting for a good person to be born of good people, just as a human being is born of a human being and a beast of beasts. Often, however, though nature tends toward this result, it is unable to achieve it. 30 40 1255b

It is clear, then, that there is some reason for the dispute, and that <those enslaved> are not invariably natural slaves, nor are <the enslavers> naturally free. It is also clear that in some cases the natural slave and the free person are distinguished; in these cases it is expedient for the natural slave to be enslaved and for the naturally free person to 5

Aristotle explains why people believe (2). He then resolves the dispute by rejecting (2).

48. **goodwill:** Read *eunoia*. (OCT: 'foolishness', *anoia*.) This is the goodwill shown by the victors in not enslaving the vanquished. On this view, enslavement is unjust.

49. **taken in separation:** i.e., separated from the assumption that force implies virtue.

50. **say it is not just:** They imply this because of the other things they believe.

51. **they . . . slaves:** In claiming that only foreigners are genuine slaves as a result of conquest, they admit that natural inferiority determines whether someone ought to be enslaved.

be master. It is right for one to be ruled and for the other to rule, in the way that is natural for both of them, so that it is right for one to be master <and the other the slave>. To rule badly is to rule inexpediently for both of them. For the same thing is expedient for the part as for the whole, and for the body as for the soul, and the slave is a sort of part of the master, since, though he is separated from his master's body, he is a sort of animate part of it. Hence the same thing is expedient for slave and master, and there is friendship<sup>52</sup> between them, if they are naturally worthy of these positions; but the contrary is true of those who are slaves only by convention and force and do not deserve to be slaves.

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BOOK II

[CRITICISMS OF PROPOSALS FOR IDEAL STATES<sup>1</sup>]

[THE AIM OF THE INQUIRY]

1 Our decision is to study the best political community for those who are capable of living, as far as possible, in the conditions they would aspire to live in;<sup>2</sup> hence we must also investigate the political systems that are found in cities said to be well governed,<sup>3</sup> and also any systems other people have proposed that seem well conceived. Our aim is to see what the correct condition is for a city and what is useful, and also to show that, in searching for something different from these systems, we are not behaving like people who want above all to play the sophist,<sup>4</sup> but are undertaking this line of inquiry in response to the inadequacies of current systems. . . .

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52. **friendship:** Cf. EN 1161a32–b8.  
1. Bk ii is concerned with the proposals of various theorists and with the actual states (e.g., Sparta and Crete) that some people have presented as models. The extracts translated come from the criticism of Plato's *Republic*.  
2. **aspire to live in:** Lit. 'would pray to live in'. Cf. 1288b23, 1295a39, 1325b36. Aristotle assumes favorable external circumstances for his ideal state, though he does not intend his assumptions to be so unrealistic that his ideal state becomes a mere utopia.  
3. **well governed:** See GOOD GOVERNMENT.  
4. **play the sophist:** by irrelevant displays of novelty and cleverness, with no good reasons for rejecting other views. Cf. EN 1146a21–27.

[SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITIZENS ARE ESSENTIAL TO A CITY]

2 The proposal that all <the rulers'> women should be shared<sup>5</sup> raises many objections. In particular Socrates' arguments do not make it apparent why he thinks this legislation is needed. Moreover, the end he prescribes for the city is impossible, taken literally, and he has not explained how else we should take it.<sup>6</sup> I refer to Socrates' assumption that it is best if all the city is as unified as possible. It is evident, on the contrary, that as the city goes further and further in the direction of unity, it will finally not even be a city. For a city is by nature a mass<sup>7</sup> of people; as it becomes more and more unified, first the city will turn into a household, and then the household will turn into just one person<sup>8</sup>—for we would say that a household is more unified than a city, and one person more unified than a household. And so, even if someone were capable of completely unifying a city, he should not do it, since he would destroy the city.

Besides, a city is composed, not merely of a number of human beings, but of those different in kind—for similar people do not constitute a city. For a city is different from an alliance; for since an alliance naturally aims at assistance, the added quantity, even of something the same in kind, makes the ally useful (like a weight that pulls a balance down further). A city differs in the same way from a nation\* that is not scattered in separate villages but <is all together>, as the Arcadians<sup>9</sup> are. <In contrast to these cases,> the parts from which a unity<sup>10</sup> comes to be must differ in kind.

This is why reciprocal equality preserves a city, as we said before in the *Ethics*.<sup>11</sup> Even free and equal people need this, since they cannot all rule at the same time, but must rule for a year, or some other fixed length of time. Such an arrangement ensures that they all rule—just as if cobblers and carpenters were to change occupations, and the same people were not cobblers or carpenters all the time. Since <the normal

5. **The proposal . . . shared:** Plato, *Rep.* 457d.  
6. **taken . . . take it:** Lit. 'as he states it, and how we should divide <the reasonable from the unreasonable interpretations> is not at all defined'. This is a frequent line of objection to PLATO.  
7. **mass:** i.e., a large number. See 1274b41.  
8. **just one person:** This, then, results from taking Plato's advice literally.  
9. **Arcadians:** Their villages formed a federation, without the structure that Aristotle takes to be necessary for a *polis*.  
10. **a unity:** Cf. *Met.* 1040b5–16.  
11. *Ethics:* 1132b33.